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a b s t r a c t
The existence of parallel economies that operate in the shadows of informality withinmost
Latin American countries is widely recognized by the economic literature. However, its
composition, size and effects on economic growth are still open questions. In this paper,
we estimate the size and the evolution of the Mexican informal economy in the last three
decades using a vector error correction model. In addition to the standard explanatory
variables traditionally used in the currency demand approach, we include remittances
given their relevance in theMexican economic system. The results indicate that informality
prior to the late 1980s accounted for at least two thirds of GDP,while stabilizing around one
third of GDP in the last decade. Furthermore, our estimates provide evidence of a positive
long-run relationship between informality and economic growth.
© 2009 University of Venice. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Economies in most of the developing world are characterized by huge informal sectors. In a globalized world dominated
by immense economic flows, understanding the causes, the size and the effects of these phenomena represents a priority
in the economic literature. Although the problem of informality is not new, an agreement on a unique unanimously
accepted definition, a comprehensive theoretical model as well as a clear measuring method are still missing. This confirms
the difficulty posed by a phenomenon that operates in the shadows of illegality and whose causes and resources vary
among countries. From now on, we will refer to informality as all the income generating activities that are unregulated by
institutions.1 One of the first authors that analysed informality in the developingworld was De Soto (1989), who studied the
informal sector in Peru, giving insights and evidence on the development and interactions of Peru’s underground economy.
However, the first rigorous treatment can be tracked back to Loayza (1997), who used an AK endogenous growth model to
study informality causes, and the multiple indicators multiple causes method (MIMIC) to measure the size of informality
in Latin America. Unfortunately, estimates of the informal sector are done using cross-section analysis that study short
periods of time, thus precluding us from capturing its evolution over time and reaction to economic shocks. In this paper,
we will focus on measuring the size and evolution of informality in Mexico, in order to contribute to the understanding of
the interactions and effects of the underground economy not observable in the previous regional studies.
The Mexican economy, as the rest of Latin America, has always been characterized by a parallel economy. Street vendors
and their micro-businesses, known as ‘‘vendedores ambulantes’’, plague huge areas of all the major urban centres in the
country. These irregular economic agents form part of the daily reality of the Mexican life. Far from what could be thought,
they are well organized and are under the protection of specific groups in charge of negotiating with, or bribing the
∗ Corresponding address: School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, University of Reading, Early Gate, RG6 6AR, Reading, UK. Tel.: +44 0118 378
7693; fax: +44 0118 975 6467.
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1 See Portes et al. (1989), and Portes and Haller (2005).
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authorities. Their presence is a source of discontent and negative externalities to the formal establishment that continuously
lobby for their removal. Informality distorts prices and forces wages below its optimum equilibrium,2 giving to formal,
national or foreign economic agents the perception of an institutional void, that could have long-run consequences for the
economy.
As Roubaud (1995) pointed out, economic agents react to economic shocks adopting new survival strategies. In the case of
Mexico, and probably the rest of Latin America, these new survival strategies include the establishment of micro-businesses
in the shadowof the informal sector. Employment in this sector appears as a natural alternative to copewith sharp decreases
in income, high unemployment rates, continuous economic crisis and adverse business regulations.
In this context, measuring the size of the Mexican informal sector becomes relevant, since it certainly affects the
macroeconomy and development of the country. Its magnitude and effects on growth (positive or negative relationship)
are still open questions in the literature.3
The Mexican authorities are aware of this; so, the Mexican National Statistics Institute (INEGI) conducts surveys in an
attempt to measure the quantity of agents that work in the informal sector.4 The surveys indicate that almost 30% of the
Economic Active Population (EAP) is engaged in the underground economy. Empirical estimates by Schneider (2002) and
Vuletin (2008) attribute a size of 33.2% and 28.2% of GDP respectively to the informal sector. Unfortunately, these estimates
refer to the late 1990s early 2000s, and are usually point estimates, precluding their use to analyse in depth the phenomenon
and its possible evolution over time. Therefore, we decided to estimate a specific informal sector time series for theMexican
economy. In order to do so, we used the ‘‘classic’’ currency demand approach, going back in time as much as the data
constraints allowed us.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief description of the currency demand
approach. Section 3 briefly summarizes the data and methodology. In Section 4, we present our results for the vector error
correctionmodel (VEC). Next, we used the VEC estimates to compute the size of the informal sector inMexico. The procedure
and the results are summarized in Section 5. Furthermore, in Section 6 we use the estimated time series for the informal
sector to analyse its relationship with economic growth, and, finally, in Section 7 we offer some final remarks and policy
recommendations.
2. The currency demand approach
Before jumping into the technicalities of the currency demand approach, we will describe briefly the whole set of
techniques available in the literature to measure informality. We can classify them into three categories5:
(1) Direct Methods: thesemethods refer usually to public or private surveys6 and target directly potential informal workers
in an attempt to quantify participation in the underground economy.
(2) Indirect Methods: these methods use discrepancies in official records (differences between official and actual labour
force, discrepancies between national income and consumption, different monetarymethods, etc.) as proxies of the size
of the informal sector.7
(3) MIMIC or Model Approach: although this approach seems to belong to the indirect methodology, it differs from the
previous methods, since it is able to link unobserved variables to observed indicators, using structural equations that
model causal relationships among the unobserved variables.8
The currency demand approach can be classified among the indirect methods. This approach has been widely used in the
past decades to estimate informality mainly in developed countries.9
The family of monetary methods dates back to Cagan (1958), Gutmann (1977) and Feige (1979), but it was Tanzi (1983)
that made the currency demand approach very popular among economists. The main assumption supporting this type of
approach is that transactions in the informal sector use mostly cash, in order to maintain their activities in the shadows,
away from any kind of formal record. So, if we could estimate the amount of cash used for informal transactions, we should
be able to infer the size of the informal sector in the economy.
The idea behind the currency demand methods used in the literature is well summarized in a recent critical assessment
by Ahumada et al. (2006). Following their work, a typical Cagan (1958) type currency demand function can be written as:
C0 = A(1+Θ)
αY
β
0 exp(−γ i) (1)
2 See IMF (2005) Country Report on Mexico-Selected Issues.
3 Previous empirical studies have found contradictory evidence on the relationship between informality and growth. On the one hand, Helberger and
Knepel (1988), Loayza (1997), and Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), among others, find a negative relation. On the other hand, Tedds (1998), Giles and
Tedds (2002) and more recently Chaudhuri et al. (2006) find a positive impact of informality on growth.
4 The survey started in 2000 and annual averages are available in the Appendix.
5 See Schneider (2002) for a detailed description.
6 In Mexico, these type of surveys are conducted by the National Statistics Institute (INEGI), while surveys covering a wider sample of countries are
conducted by the International Labour Organization (ILO).
7 Examples of these methods can be found in Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), and Tanzi (1983).
8 The use of the MIMIC approach for estimation of the informal sector was first introduced by Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984).
9 See Shima (2004) for Norway; Tanzi (1983) for USA; Klovland (1984) for Norway and Sweden; Bovi and Castellucci (2001) for Italy; Bovi and Dell’Anno
(2007) for OECD countries.
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where C0 stands for observed cash andΘ represents the variable that gives incentives to make hidden transactions. This is
the key variable behind all currencymodels.10 Traditionally this incentive variable has been approximated using government
consumption normalized by GDP, tax rates (direct taxes, indirect taxes, etc.) or tax revenues to GDP. An increase in Θ
is expected to have a positive impact on currency demand, since agents will have more incentives to go to the informal
sector, demanding more currency for their transactions. Y0 is the registered GDP. This variable approximates the level of
transactions in the economy. Alternative measures are GDP per capita or consumption per capita. Finally, i is the interest
rate and A, α, β, γ represent positive parameters.
Estimating Eq. (1), we obtain Cˆ . Setting the incentive variableΘ to zero, and leaving the coefficients of the other variables
unchanged, we get C˜ . The difference between Cˆ and C˜ allows us to estimate extra currency, i.e. the amount of currency
holdings that are tax induced. In other words, the difference measures the amount of illegal money in the economy. Now,
assuming that the velocity of money11 is the same in both the formal and informal sector,12 we can obtain an estimate of
the size of the informal economy multiplying illegal money (Cˆ − C˜) by the velocity of money (v = Y/C).
3. Methodology and data
This study uses annual data series that cover a period from 1970 to 2006. The main sources used to collect the data
are: the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the Mexican Central Bank
(online) database and the Mexican National Statistics Institute (INEGI). A more exhaustive description of the variables and
their sources is provided in the Appendix.
As pointed out by Guissarri (1987), one of the first decisions to be taken in a currency demandmodel is how to deflate the
currency series. In the classical approach popularized by Tanzi (1983), the standard procedure imposes currency deflation
using M2.13 However, this assumption was widely criticized. Spiro (1996) claims that the use of M2 is inadequate, since
it contains amounts that correspond to long-term wealth accumulation, while currency is used mainly for transaction
processes. Refinements went on and, nowadays, economists studying the informal sector use currency and currency per
capita in real terms (see Schneider and Enste, 2000, and Öğ ´¨unç and Yilmaz, 2000). So, we decided to deflate our series
using the national GDP deflator and, in order to capture the long-run relationships of the explanatory variables on currency
demand, we set up the following model14:
Ct = β0 + β1Yt + β2TAXt + β3Rt + β4REMt + υt (2)
where:
• C corresponds to the natural logarithm of currency in circulation outside the banks normalized by the GDP deflator;
• Y is the log of GDP in real terms;
• TAX represents the log of total tax revenues normalized by GDP;
• R refers to the log of the simple average of existing nominal interest rates;
• REM indicates the log of the amount of remittances received normalized by GDP.
• υ is the error term.
The above specification captures the long-run relationships between the explanatory variables and the currency demand.
Note that in addition to the standard independent variables, we decided to include remittances. With globalization and
massive migrations to the developed world, remittances magnitude has surpassed the one of foreign direct investment in
many developing countries, prompting a peak of interest on their economic implications and their role in the long-run.
10 Some of the critics to this type of approach refer precisely to the use of taxes as the only incentive for informality, claiming that not all underground
activities are due to taxes, so the estimates obtained using the currency method are not able to capture the real level of informality.
11 This assumption is quite reasonable in the Mexican context. According to the ‘‘Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores’’ (CNBV), credit cards remain
largely an untapped market, and in 2005 Mexicans used cash for more than 86% of their transactions. Furthermore, Mexico underwent the privatization of
its banking system during the late 1990s and the entrance of foreign banks during the early 2000s; nevertheless, private saving decreased. See Bulír˘ and
Swiston (2006).
12 This assumption has been criticized and, as Ahumada et al. (2006) claim, even if the velocity is the same, previous works that find β 6= 1 (i.e. income
elasticity different from 1) are incorrect. Therefore, they propose an alternative way of correcting the estimates.
13 Tanzi (1983) estimated the following equation: Ln(C/M2) = a0 + a1LnT + a2Ln(WS/NI) + a3LnR + a4LnY + e, where C/M2 is the ratio of currency
holdings to money, T is a tax variable, WS/NI is the ratio of wages and salaries in national income, R is a time deposit interest rate and Y is the real per
capita income.
14 The model can be interpreted as a log-linearization of Eq. (1).
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Remittances
The text figure plots the evolution of FDI and remittances in Mexico during the past three decades. Although modest during
the 1970s, remittances have grown almost exponentially in the past twenty years, gaining weight in the Mexican economic
scenario. Indeed, according to theWorld Bank (2006), remittances in 2003were the nation’s second largest source of external
finance after oil revenues15 (see text figure), surpassing traditional flows as foreign direct investment (FDI) and tourism
revenues. Remittances are expected to have a positive impact on currency demand, especially because they enter the country
in the form of money orders or as foreign currency (mainly US dollars) in the pockets of migrant workers. It is important to
point out that the series that we are using correspond to ‘‘recorded’’ remittances, which can be seen as a lower bound, since
the actual amount is muchmore above. TheWorld Bank’s estimates indicate that the actual amount of remittances could be
50% higher.16 Another reason to include remittances as an explanatory variable has to do directly with informality. Although
the former have not been totally associated with money laundry, it is well recognized that migrant workers usually engage
inwhat is known as ‘‘smurfing’’ – separating transfers into smaller packages or different accounts, in order to avoid reporting
and fulfilling local requirements such as taxation on larger amounts – giving birth to different kinds of informal flows.17 The
opaqueness of these channels restraints in deep analysis. However, although the Mexican economy is closely linked to the
US dollar, local transactions are made mostly using the national currency. So, migrant workers or their families are forced
in one way or another to convert (using formal or informal channels) their dollars into Mexican pesos, thus increasing the
demand for currency.
Summarizing, we expect a positive impact on currency demand for GDP, taxes and remittances (β1,β2,β4 > 0), since an
increase in these variables will put pressure on currency demand.18 On the other hand, interest rate increases are expected
to have a negative effect, prompting economic agents to get rid of their currency holdings (β3 < 0).
Before proceedingwith the estimation, we tested our series for the presence of unit roots and cointegration19 in ourmain
specification. All series turn out to be strongly non-stationary and integrated of order 1. Trace tests on one hand indicate
two cointegrating equations at the 5% level and one at the 1% level, while the eigenvalue test indicates one cointegrating
equation at the 1% level. This allows us to conclude that there exists one cointegration relationship.20
Given the non-stationarity of our series and the presence of a common stochastic trend, traditional estimation methods
are ruled out. So, in order to estimate Eq. (2) and measure the size of the informal sector, we decided to tackle the problem
using a vector error correctionmodel (VECM). This type ofmodels present a series of improvementswith respect to standard
approaches, allowing us to analyse short and long-run effects.
Examples of error correction models to measure informality can be found in works by Bovi (1999), Bovi and Castellucci
(2001) and, more recently, in Chiarini and Marzano (2004) with respect to Italy.
The different VECM’s estimated in this paper can be defined as follows:
1Yt = δ + Γ11Yt−1 +ΠYt−1 + εt (3)
where Y is a vector formed by the n variables used in our currency demand model (i.e. C, Y, TAX, R and REM21). Π and Γ
are 5× 5 matrices made up by the system coefficients. If the rank of cointegration r is less than n, thenΠ = γ β ’, where γ
15 According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2004 Mexico ranked number five as one of the top oil producers of the world. For more
details see www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/.
16 See World Bank (2006), p. xiii and p. 85. and OECD (2007), chapter 6.
17 We refer interested readers to a special report from the World Bank by Hernandez-Coss (2005) dealing with the US–Mexico remittances corridor.
18 Note that the positive impact of taxes on currency demand can be interpreted in Tanzi’s spirit as follows: as the level of taxation rises, economic agents
will be encouraged to engage tax-evading activities, which are facilitated by the use of currency, due to the intractability of cash; as a consequence, the use
of currency rises.
19 The detailed analysis and tests can be found in the Appendix.
20 The existence of only one cointegration vector in our system means that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between C , Y , TAX, R, and REM.
21 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank (2007), among others, address the issue of potential endogeneity of
remittances. So, we include remittances in the set of endogenous variables.
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Table 1
Normalized cointegrating coefficients.
Model (1)a (2)a (3)a (4)b
Trace statistic 5% 2 1 1 3
1% 1 0 0 1
Max eigenvalue statistic 5% 1 0 0 1
1% 0 0 0 0
Ct−1 1.00 1.00 1.00
C/M2t−1 1.00
Yt−1 −0.76
*** −0.63*** −0.11
(0.04) (0.07) (0.18)
Ypct−1 0.38
(2.20)
TAXt−1 −0.49
*** −0.44* −12.61***
(0.13) (0.28) (3.78)
Rt−1 0.09
*** 0.18*** 0.22*** −0.34
(0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.40)
REMt−1 −0.12
***
(0.03)
GOVt−1 −0.03
(0.57)
Cons −2.75*** −6.97*** −23.39*** 23.87
(1.10) (2.15) (4.26) (23.44)
Log likelihood 191.85 180.73 189.64 136.17
X2 673.99 141.17 21.42 11.19
All variables are in natural logs. In addition to the previously described variables in Section 3, we have:
•C/M2: The ratio between currency outside the banks and M2 (broad money);
•Gov: The ratio between government consumption and GDP;
•Ypc: GDP per capita.
Note: All series used in the models are I (1). The complete details of the analysis as well as the matrix of adjustment coefficients can be found in the
Appendix. The number of lags in the models were determined using Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC)
and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC).
All models we estimated assume one cointegrating equation. Standard errors are in parentheses.
a Model was estimated using two lags.
b Model was estimated using four lags.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
represents the adjustment coefficients and β the cointegrating vectors. Finally, ε corresponds to our system residuals and δ
is a constant term which can be separated in two parts – a trend term and the intercept – in the cointegrating relation.
4. Results and their robustness
In order to test the robustness of our model, we also estimate Eq. (2) without remittances, in addition, following
Guissarri’s (1987) specification we estimate the model using government consumption normalized by GDP instead of tax
burden and finally we use an approximation of the classical Tanzi (1983) model. The long-run cointegrating coefficients are
reported in Table 1.
As expected, in model (1), which corresponds to Eq. (2), the coefficients for output, tax burden and remittances have a
positive long-run effect, while interest rates take the pressure off currency demand. All coefficients are strongly significant
and assign relevant weight to GDPwith a coefficient of 0.76 and taxes with 0.49, while leaving amoderate but not negligible
effect to remittances with a coefficient of 0.12.
The performance of Model (2) is weaker compared to Model (1) and the TAX variable is barely significant; moreover it
still retains significance among all its coefficients. On the other hand, Models (3) and (4) fail to maintain significance in all
their variables except for taxes and interest rates.
In Model (4) we are forced to approximate Tanzi’s original specification using only income per capita, taxes and interest
rates in order to explain variations in the currency ratio (C/M2). This ismainly due to data constraints. Hence,we are not able
to include the ratio of wages and salaries, as in the original specification. Nevertheless, the model can be used to measure
the explanatory power of this type of specification for the Mexican context, and as we can see from Table 1, this type of
modelling has very little explanatory power with respect to the currency ratio in the economy. Furthermore, the interest
rates present a negative sign in the cointegrating coefficient (−0.34), which can be interpreted as having a positive effect
on currency holdings, which is in contradiction with the economic theory.
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5. The size of the informal sector
After estimating the vector error correction model (VECM)22 and obtaining the coefficients for the long-run relationship
of Eq. (2) reported as Model (1) in Table 1, we proceed to estimate the size of the informal economy.
In order to obtain an estimate of the size of the informal sector, first, we compute Cˆ using all the coefficients in Eq. (4).
Then, we set the tax variable equal to zero and re-estimate the equation keeping all the other coefficients unchanged to
obtain C˜ .
C = 2.75+ 0.76Y + 0.49TAX − 0.09R+ 0.12Rem. (4)
The difference between these two variables – Cˆ and C˜ – give us the amount of extra currency in the economy. Following
Tanzi (1983), we assume equal velocity in both the formal and informal sector, and estimate it as follows:
Y
M1− EC
= v. (5)
Eq. (5) yields the velocity of money in the Mexican economy. Y is the GDP, M1 corresponds to total currency and deposits
in circulation, and EC stands for extra currency or illegal money.
The difference between M1 and EC can be interpreted as the amount of legal money used in the economy. Once we
estimate the velocity from Eq. (5), the size of the informal sector can be obtained multiplying EC by the velocity of money:
EC ∗ v = Yinformal (6)
Using Eq. (6), we can infer the size of the informal sector in formal GDP terms. From Table 1 we can also observe that our
coefficient for Y is different from 1. So, in the Ahumada et al. (2006) spirit, we proceed to correct our estimates using their
suggested method23:
Yinformal
Yformal
=
(
Cinformal
Cformal
) 1
β
=
(
Yˆinformal
Yˆformal
) 1
β
(7)
where Y and C are the GDP and money respectively, while β is the income elasticity. The correction basically deflates the
‘‘wrong’’ ratio (Yˆinformal/Yˆformal) that we obtained using inappropriately the assumption β = 1. Eq. (7) corrects our estimates
when β 6= 1.
Our original and corrected results normalized by the formal GDP are summarized below (see text figure).
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Aswe can see, informality in the 1990s and early 2000s stabilizes around 20%–30% of GDP, which is in line with the previous
studies.24 The rest of the series, unfortunately, cannot be compared; so, inference should be taken with caution. Informality
fluctuated between 50% and 60% of GDP during the 1970s and presents a huge jump in the 1980s, reaching almost 85% of
GDP in 1988. Although at first sight this magnitude could seem out of proportion, we should clarify that this period was
characterized by great economic and political turmoil in Mexico and the rest of Latin America. Moreover, deep crises and
hyperinflation affected the south of the continent, and Mexico registered inflation rates above 100% (see Fig. 2).
So, in this period, inflation and macroeconomic instability clearly played a major role on currency demand. However, to
which extent inflation or informality can explain this peak is difficult to assess. Inflation rates above 100% occurred in 1983,
1987 and 1988, while hyper-informality is registered in 1988 and 1989.
Fig. 1 plots both formal and informal series in real terms. If we compare both series, the presence of a parallel economy
in Mexico can be appreciated. This underground economy grew continuously during the early 1970s and the late 1980s,
accounting on average for almost two thirds of GDP. Informality then fell abruptly in the early 1990s and remained stable
around one third of GDP until our days.
22 The long-run relationship between our variables was derived normalizing C .
23 Ahumada et al. (2006) show that it iswrong to assume the same velocity ofmoneywhen the hypothesisβ = 1 is rejected by the econometric estimation
of the currency demand model. This is our case, since our model gives us a coefficient β = 0.76.
24 See, for example, Vuletin (2008), Schneider (2002) and Loayza (1997).
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Fig. 1. Mexican informal sector.
Unemployment
Remittances
Inflation
Inflation, Unemployment and Remittances
Fig. 2. Inflation, unemployment and remittances in Mexico (1970–2006).
6. Informal sector and economic growth
As we explain in the previous sections of the paper, one of the aims of this study is to estimate a series for the
informal sector, in order to use it to establish its long-run relationship with economic growth. To do so, once we have
our informal economy series we have decided to apply the general to specific approach.25 This methodology starts by
setting a large general model that encompasses many explanatory variables (the idea behind this is that the model will
lose more explanatory power if relevant variables are omitted rather than if irrelevant variables are included) and slowly
start eliminating variables with not significant coefficients until we reach a simpler, but more robust model.
For this part of the study we use annual data starting in 1970 and going all the way until 2006. The sources are again
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the Mexican Central Bank
(online) database.
We start from an over-parameterized model and slowly pin down variables until we are left with the most significant
model. Eq. (8) describes the general economic growthmodel. In addition to the traditional variables we include the so called
25 See for example Hendry (1995).
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Table 2
Growth regressions (ARDL Models).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Yt−1 −0.950 −0.167 −0.206
* −0.243*** −0.260*** −0.260*** −0.242***
(0.136) (0.126) (0.112) (0.075) (0.064) (0.062) (0.071)
1PEt . −0.008 −0.007 0.001 −0.001 0.002
(0.020) (0.027) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018)
PEt−1 0.002 0.023 0.031
* 0.027 0.029* 0.029** 0.027*
(0.030) (0.023). (0.018) (0.021) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016)
1TRADEt . −0.030 −0.055 −0.099 −0.109 −0.128 −0.128
* −0.109
(0.106) (0.103) (0.087) (0.089) (0.078) (0.075) (0.081)
TRADEt−1. 0.177
*** 0.082* 0.076* 0.043*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.044**
(0.061) (0.049) (0.047) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
1GOVt . 0.112 0.138 0.170
* 0.115 0.148 0.146* 0.117
(0.158) (0.137) (0.104) (0.119) (0.092) (0.084) (0.110)
GOVt−1. 0.123
* 0.142** 0.158*** 0.153** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.152**
(0.066) (0.068) (0.060) (0.065) (0.051) (0.050) (0.064)
1Inflat . −0.007 −0.012 −0.008 −0.008
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Inflat−1. −0.004 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003
(0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006)
1Popt . 3.474 0.122 −0.639
(8.347) (9.203) (4.988)
Popt−1. −0.154 −0.124 −0.100
(0.240) (0.233) (0.156)
1FDIt . −0.015
(0.022)
FDIt−1. −0.051
(0.030)
Cons 4.110 3.937 3.840 2.330*** 2.484*** 2.493*** 2.322***
R2 0.602 0.535 0.522 0.521 .514 .514 .521
RMSE 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.026
The regressions were estimated using annual data starting in 1970 until 2006. Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level.
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.
* Indicates significance at the 10% level.
Parallel Economy (the informal sector).
1Yt = a11Tradet + a21Govt + a31Inflat + a41Popt + a51PEt + a61FDIt
+ (b7 − 1)
[
Yt−1 + βo + β1Tradet−1 + β2Govt−1 + β3Inflat−1+
β4Popt−1 + β5PEt−1 + β6FDIt−1
]
+ υt (8)
where:
• Y is real GDP per capita;
• Trade corresponds to (Exp+ Imp)/GDP;
• Gov is Government consumption as percentage of GDP;
• Pop indicates demographic developments;
• PE is the parallel economy;
• FDI corresponds to foreign direct investment as percentage of GDP.
From Eq. (8) we are interested in obtaining a simpler model specification from which we can infer the long-run
relationship between economic growth and parallel economies.
The results from the various specifications are presented in Table 2. As expected, the initial model, specification (1),
although presenting the highest R2, includes only two statistically significant variables, TRADE and Gov. So, we start
eliminating variableswhose coefficients are not significant and thatwe believe are not relevant for the long-run relationship
between growth and informality. Therefore, in specification (3), we eliminate FDI and inflation, that we believe will have
more impact in the short-run, indeed, we start getting significance for the Parallel economy variable (PEt−1), the long-run
coefficient 0.031 becomes significant at the 10% level.
It is important to point out that trade and government consumption remain significant throughout all the models,
highlighting their relevance for the Mexican economy. Going on, we arrive at specification (6), where all variables are
significant and the parallel economy turns out to have a positive effect on economic growth.
So, using specification (6) we can derive the long-run relationship between the remaining variables and the Mexican
economic growth. The long-run model is presented below as Eq. (9).
Y = 29.59+ 0.11PE + 0.19TRADE + 0.64GOV . (9)
The former equation shows us the weights of each variable in the long-run and their effects on the Mexican economic
growth. We can see that Government consumption represents the biggest driving force of the Mexican economy, being
almost 3 times higher than international trade.
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7. Concluding remarks
The existence of a parallel economy in Mexico and other Latin American economies is well documented and accepted by
the economic literature. It is the size and composition of this sector as well as the measuring methodology that are open to
debate. In this paper, we used the currency demand approach to obtain a measure of informality in Mexico from the early
1970s until 2006.
Our results provide an example of the evolution of informality in a developing country. First, the underground economy
in Mexico grows constantly during the 1970s until it reaches its maximum in the late 1980s. Then, it decreases sharply
and stabilizes around 30% of GDP. This is not entirely good news. In a country with nearly 100 million inhabitants and 840
billion US dollars of GDP, this amount of informality represents a hugeweight on the formal establishment, creating negative
externalities, anchoring the nation and precluding it from reaching its real economic potential.
Furthermore, the stagnation of informality that characterized the past decade reflects the failure or lack of public policies
targeting the informal sector, which consequently has left a large proportion of economic agents at the margins of the legal
framework. Government lack of interest in this area will certainly have a deep impact and a huge cost on output in the
long-run.
So, it is imperative to elaborate long-term strategies, in order to help to channel informal agents and their economic flows
– i.e. remittances – back to formality. The Mexican government should create the conditions in order to allow informal
remittances and income to be converted into productive investment. Successful policies will alleviate pressure on public
finances and formal establishments in the short-run, allowing the re-direction of new resources needed to finance growth.
On the other hand, in the long-run, the entry of informal agents into the legal framework will add fair competitiveness to
the markets rising salaries and production quality.
Finally, Mexican policy makers should focus on the development of a slimmer regulation framework (i.e. fewer
bureaucratic procedures, quick times and low costs, but above all less corrupt system), attractive enough to incentive
effectively informal agents to come back to the formal economy.
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Appendix
See Tables A.1–A.5.
Table A.1
Data.
Variable Description Sources
C Natural logarithm of currency over GDP deflator.
1970-2006 in national currency
International Financial Statistics, (IMF), the series is also available
entirely or partially at the Mexican Central Bank Web page
(www.banxico.com)
Y Natural logarithm of real GDP 1970–2006 in national
currency
International Financial Statistics, (IMF), the series are also
available at INEGI and Banxico’s web page.
TAX Natural Logarithm of 1 + total of tax revenues over GDP
1970–2006
This series is partially available online, data before the late 1980s
are available only on paper records. The series used in this paper
comes mainly from the Mexican Central Bank online database
(www.banxico.com) Alternative Sources are: The Mexican
Secretariat for Public Finance (SHCP), The National Statistics
Institute (INEGI), and the Mexican Senate Economic Affairs
Center.
R Natural logarithm of the average of time deposit interest
rates 1970–2006
This series was calculated using the CPP (costo porcentual
promedio) that corresponds to the simple average of nominal
interest rates. The registry of this type of index started in 1975, so
the series was extended back to 1970. Sources: Mexican Central
Bank, alternative source: Diario Oficial de la Nacion
REM Natural logarithm of remittances normalized by GDP
1970–2006
World Development Indicators (World Bank) and Banxico. The
series was used in national currency
M1 1970–2006 in local currency International Financial Statistics(IMF) and Banxico
Inflation 1970–2006 International Financial Statistics (IMF)
Unemployment Rate of unemployment respect to Economic active
population in urban areas 1976–2006
World Economic Outlook (IMF) and INEGI. Note: the first
estimations were computed by INEGI using as sample only 3
major cities. Nowadays estimates are done in a much wider
sample.
Foreign direct
investment
Net inflows (BoP current US dollars) 1970–2005 World Development Indicators (World Bank)
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Table A.2
Unit root tests.
Test Variables C Y TAX R REM
Augmented Dickey–Fullera Level −1.19 −2.35 −3.34** −0.84 −1.72
First difference −6.68*** −4.12*** −4.79*** −4.78*** −4.86***
Phillips–Perrona Level −1.04 −2.35 −2.65* −1.15 −1.52
First difference −6.72*** −4.12*** −4.77*** −4.77*** −4.91***
Augmented Dickey–Fullerb Level −2.12 −3.06 −2.47 −1.04 −0.77
First difference −6.57*** −4.35*** −4.73*** −5.08*** −3.58**
Phillips–Perronb Level −2.14 −2.45 −2.63 −1.13 −1.11
First difference −6.61*** −4.36*** −4.69*** −5.08*** −4.92***
Augmented Dickey–Fullerc Level 1.87 6.24 0.49 −0.52 −1.04
First difference −6.09*** −2.54*** −4.81*** −4.83*** −4.93***
Phillips–Perronc Level 2.19 5.11 −0.44 −0.54 −1.13
First difference −6.09*** −2.40*** −4.80*** −4.83*** −4.98***
Above we present the test statistics for both the Augmented Dickey–Fuller and the Phillips–Perron tests. The lag length was chosen using the Schwarz
Information Criterion. Null Hypothesis: variable has a unit root. Note:
*** Indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% level.
** Indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% level.
* Indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 10% level.
a Test was conducted using an intercept.
b Test was conducted using a trend and intercept.
c No trend nor intercept included.
Table A.3
Cointegration test Johansen cointegration test.
Null hypothesis Alternative hypothesis 5% Critical value 1% Critical value
λtrace tests λtrace value
r = 0 r > 0 93.06 76.07 84.45
r ≤ 1 r > 1 58.10 53.12 60.16
r ≤ 2 r > 2 32.62 34.91 41.07
r ≤ 3 r > 3 15.92 19.96 24.60
r ≤ 4 r > 4 5.15 9.24 12.97
λmax tests λmax value
r = 0 r = 1 34.96 34.40 39.79
r = 1 r = 2 25.47 28.14 33.24
r = 2 r = 3 16.70 22.00 26.81
r = 3 r = 4 10.77 15.67 20.20
r = 4 r = 5 5.15 9.24 12.97
Given the small size of our series we used a maximum of two lags running the tests. No deterministic trend.
Table A.4
Estimated matrix of adjustment coefficients.
1C 1Y 1TAX 1R 1REM
−0.99 −0.23 0.06 1.19 −0.44
(0.17) (0.09) (0.34) (1.36) (0.75)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table A.5
INEGI survey.
Year Informal sector
2000 26.96
2001 27.52
2002 28.24
2003 28.81
2004 28.76
2005 28.13
2006 27.20
Source: INEGI, Mexico.
Note: Annual averages
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